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CURBING THE EXPLOITATION OF
PASSIVE CREDITORS IN CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATION BY LEVERAGING
THE OVERSIGHT ROLE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRUSTEE
ADDISON PIERCE*
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is beginning to show its age in
ways similar to the forty-year-old code it replaced. In addition to being
ill-suited to address changes in the underlying credit market, the
current code is confronting the development of an entirely new market
place-a market in claims trading. While some praise the enhanced
liquidity, others take issue with the strains placed on the efficacy of
bankruptcy. Rather than engaging in the normative debate, this
Comment seeks to redress a clear drawback to the current system: the
harm endured by passive creditors. Unlike those economically
empowered to participate in the reorganization process, the passive
creditor lacks the economic ability and incentive to play an active role.
This position leaves the passive creditor's ability to collect on its claim
solely in the hands of another: the creditors' committee. While this
committee may have provided adequate protection in 1978, the credit
market and its participants are very different today. Some argue that
this issue is systemic and can only be addressed by replacing the
current code; however, this Comment argues that something can be
done short of this massive task. The challenge is as follows: if too little
is done, passive creditors will continue to be exploited and if too much
is done the whole market could be damaged. Recognizing this
challenge, this Comment proposes that passive creditors can be
afforded adequate protection by leveraging the oversight power of the
US Trustee to ensure the proper functioning of creditors' committees.
Moreover, the recommendation of this Comment would enhance
protection for passive creditor while remaining market neutral.
* Senior Articles Editor, American University Business Law Review, Volume 4;
Washington College of Law J.D. Candidate 2015. Many thanks to The American
University Business Law Review and Professors Bernie Corr and Walter Effross.
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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy is an attempt to prevent a tragedy of the commons.' Without
bankruptcy, "creditors would resort to self-help measures to collect debts
owed to them" by a failed or failing organization ("the debtor").2 The
foreclosure and liquidation assets would favor the sophisticated over the
1. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, Ill HARv. L. REV. 621, 677 (1998) ("A tragedy of
the commons can occur when too many individuals have privileges of use in a scarce
resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting separately, may collectively
overconsume scarce resources.").
2. Michael H. Whitaker, Regulating Claims Trading in Chapter II Bankruptcies:
A Proposal for Mandatory Disclosure, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 303, 306 (1993).
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passive and leave similarly situated creditors (similarly situated in right
rather than ability to collect) in disparate positions.3 Moreover, this process
would be swift and crude, as creditors would favor efficiency over care
when seeking to recover their claims.4
Instead, bankruptcy provides a safe haven for creditor and debtor alike
by staying the liquidation process and allowing the debtor and its creditors
to work together to maximize the value of the debtor's remaining assets.
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code ("Chapter 11") takes this idea a step
further.6 Rather than working to maximize the value of the remaining
assets, Chapter 11 recognizes that more value may be realized by utilizing
the going-concern value of the assets.7 Instead of liquidation and
dissolution, the debtor continues to operate under the safe haven of Chapter
11, proposes a plan of reorganization, restructures its existing debt, and
starts anew. Chapter 11 reflects the belief that the value of a business as a
going-concern may greatly exceed the value of its assets sold individually
and immediately.9
In 1978, when the Bankruptcy Code ("the Code" or "the 1978 Code")
underwent its most recent overhaul,'0 bankruptcy proceedings were
3. See id. ("[B]ankruptcy protects the interests of creditors as a group.").
4. See id. (typifying the self-interested taking of assets by a creditor as "harming
assets that would have accrued to other creditors").
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (providing an automatic stay on all proceeding
against the debtor). See generally id. at §§ 501-11 (regulating the relationship between
the creditors and the debtor and providing a means for creditors to participate in the
reorganization).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6179 (noting that unlike liquidation, "[t]he purpose of [Chapter 11] ... is to
restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its
employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders").
7. See id.; see also Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1684, 1689 (1996) (restating going-concern value, as the value of "the
continuation of the debtor's business" as opposed to the value of "dismemberment and
piecemeal sale of the assets").
8. See Whitaker, supra note 2 ("[I]t may be in the best interests of society in
general to allow the debtor to continue to operate, create a plan of reorganization,
restructure its existing debt, and start [anew]."). But see 11 U.S.C. § 112 (2012)
(providing the bankruptcy judge the authority to convert the case to Chapter 7
liquidation for cause, if for example, under (b)(4)(a) there is "substantial or continuing
loss to or diminution of the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of
rehabilitation").
9. See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) ("By
permitting reorganization .. . Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be
more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than if 'sold for scrap."' (citation
omitted)).
10. See Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11
U.S.C.) (replacing the 1898 code and its subsequent amendments with a new code).
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straightforward." A corporation in reorganization maintained a relatively
simple capital structure.12 A senior bank held a single note with a security
interest in all of the debtor's assets, and the unsecured claims were held by
a group of "dispersed, but homogenous creditors that could adequately be
represented by a committee, typically made up of a small group of the
largest unsecured claim holders."l3  With this structure, the bank, the
committee, and the debtor's managers could all sit at the bargaining table
and work out a reorganization plan.
Today, the simple structure has been replaced by a system of
unprecedented complexity and sophistication.'4 The credit markets that
underpin the entire system have undergone substantial evolution. ' Single
secured lenders have transformed into primary lenders who manage a web
of syndicated loan parcels.'6  In addition to changes in the underlying
markets, the system is also confronting the creation of a market in
bankruptcy claims.'7  Professor Adam Levitin has characterized the
development as one that:
has changed the cast of characters involved in bankruptcies. In addition
to long-standing relational creditors, like trade creditors or a single
senior secured bank or bank group, bankruptcy cases now involve
professional distressed debt investors, whose interests and behavior are
often quite different than traditional relational counterparty creditors.'8
As the market for claims trading grows,19 the pressure placed on Chapter
11. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J.
648, 651 (2009) (noting that parties "bargained with each other against a backdrop of
well-developed norms").
12. See id. (describing the structure as "relatively simple").
13. Id.
14. See id. ("Today, we no longer have a single bank and dispersed general
creditors. Dozens of constantly changing stakeholders occupy every tranche, each
pursuing its own agenda. Some seek long-term control of the business, while others
are passive, short-term investors. Others may hold a basket of both long and short
positions in multiple tranches and complicated hedges involving other businesses.").
15. See id. and accompanying text.
16. See id.
17. See Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 67, 68 (2009) (emphasizing that "nothing has changed
the face of bankruptcy in the last decade as much [claims trading]").
18. Id.
19. See Adam J. Levitin, Finding Nemo: Rediscovering the Virtues of
Negotiability in the Wake of Enron, 2007 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 83, 86 (noting that
"[a]lthough the exact size of the corporate bankruptcy claims trading market is
unknown, it was estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars about a decade
ago and has seen a prodigious growth in recent years").
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11 is disconcerting.20 If the Code was passed with the relational creditor in
mind, as this relationship erodes, so too does the Code's ability to
function.2 1
Concurrent with the growth in this new market, is a lack of growth in the
federal regulatory regime.22 The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy ("Federal
Rules") have proven permissive to the practice of claims trading,23 and
securities regulations have proven to be too narrow to reach the claims.24
Free from regulatory scrutiny, it seems almost unquestionable that claims
trading will continue to grow at a steadfast pace.2 5
The lack of regulation should not, however, be mistaken for approval.
Scholarship on claims trading actually points to the opposite; that there is
little agreement on the merits of the practice.2 6 Those who favor claims
trading focus on the enhanced liquidity and efficiency of the market
place.27 On the other side are those who argue that the net effect is negative
and that claims trading is detrimental to the proper functioning of the
Code.2 8 What is clear from this debate is that "claims trading has cross-
cutting impacts on the bankruptcy process with a net impact that is
20. See Levitin, supra note 17 (explaining that this dynamic has placed the code
under "tremendous pressure").
21. See id.
22. See Robert D. Drain & Elizabeth J. Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims Subject
to the Federal Securities Laws?, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 569, 572 (2002)
("[T]here is an active, functioning, and enormous (in terms of dollar amount) market in
distressed claims that is not actively regulated.").
23. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 300 1(e) (allowing claims to be freely alienated, save for
fraudulent transfers).
24. See generally Drain & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 571 (finding that claims in a
bankrupt corporation are not recognized as securities, rendering the securities
regulations inapplicable).
25. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 659 (expanding on the concept that
deregulated markets provide opportunities that highly regulated markets do not,
implying that the lack of regulation will encourage growth).
26. Compare Blake J. Brockway, Applying Federal Securities Law to Chapter II
Claims Conversions, 7 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 655, 668 (2008) ("The benefits of
claims trading, such as increased liquidity and economies of scale, are a major driving
force for those who support less restricted claims trading."), and Tung, supra note 7, at
1688-89 (highlighting some of the benefits of claims trading in the plan confirmation
context), with Kevin J. Coco, Empty Manipulation: Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2019
and Ownership Disclosure in Chapter II Cases, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 610, 612
(2008) (discussing the problem of empty voting wrought by claims trading), and
Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REv. 129,
129-30 (2005) (criticizing the effects of distressed debt investors on the Chapter XI
process).
27. See, e.g., Brockway, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Miller & Waisman, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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indeterminate on the available evidence."29 Further, it means, "claims
trading is not well-suited for broad policy reforms . . . [and] at this point,
we can merely identify several modest features of the claims trading market
that can be improved."3 0
Recognizing claims trading as a "fundamental feature of bankruptcy,"31
this Comment examines the relationship between claims investors and
passive creditors, and argues that the Code is failing to serve the passive
creditors in Chapter 11 proceedings.
Part 1I of this Comment examines the Bankruptcy Code with particular
attention paid to Chapter 11. This Section briefly introduces the (a)
foundation and purpose of bankruptcy. This Section then looks at (b) how
these principals are served by the 1978 Code. Finally, this Section (c)
examines how the same principals are being poorly served today due to (i)
the evolution of the credit market and (ii) the growth in claims trading.
Part III examines how the current system is allowing for the exploitation
of the passive creditors. This Section examines (a) the provisions in the
Code that permit claims trading and (b) how these provisions undercut the
principles of bankruptcy. This Section also examines (c) why this
inequality should not go unchecked, and more specifically (d) why this
inequality should draw concern.
Part IV then addresses the problems identified above by arguing that (a)
creditors' committees have a duty to maximize returns for passive
creditors. Further, this Section argues that (b) the United States Trustee
("Trustee") has a role in ensuring fulfillment of this duty. Finally, this
Section (c) provides a means by which creditors' committees can fulfil
their obligations.
I. CHAPTER I1's RESPONSIVENESS TO EVOLVING CREDIT MARKETS AND
THE RAPID GROWTH IN CLAIMS TRADING
To understand the harsh realities of the marketplace for passive creditors,
and the extent of the challenges they face, this Section begins by
introducing briefly (a) Chapter 11 bankruptcy as it was envisioned by the
Code in 1978. From this foundation, this Section then examines (b) the
market-forced evolution of bankruptcy as the Code faced unforeseen
evolutions in the credit markets. Finally, this Section (c) examines how
claims trading has exacerbated the problems brought by the evolution of
the credit markets and how it has pushed Chapter 11 cases even further
29. Levitin, supra note 17, at 70.
30. Id.
31. Douglas G. Baird, The Bankruptcy Exchange, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 23, 23 (2009).
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from bankruptcy's normative goals.
A. The Prevailing Goals of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: Safe Haven for
Debtors and Equality for Creditors
Many different bankruptcy codes have come and gone since the U.S.
Constitution granted congressional authority to establish uniform
bankruptcy procedures.32 What has remained is the impetus underlying the
procedures.3 3 Michael Whitaker describes the prevailing polices and their
foundation as follows:
Bankruptcy law attempts to ensure that all similarly situated creditors are
treated equally. More importantly, it protects the interests of creditors as a
group. Without bankruptcy law, creditors would resort to self-help
measures to collect the debts owed to them. Each creditor would act in its
own best interest, in the process taking or harming assets that would have
accrued to other creditors. Bankruptcy law attempts to minimize this
harmful behavior and to ensure that the value of the debtor's remaining
assets is maximized for all creditors.3 4
This account represents the prevailing characterization of bankruptcy in
the United States and, generally, suggests two principal goals.35 First is the
provision of a safe harbor for debtors.36 Upon filing a Chapter 11 petition37
("petition"), the debtor is provided an automatic stay preventing, among
other actions, the commencement or continuation of judicial proceedings.38
This allows the debtor to enter the next stages of bankruptcy largely intact,
having avoided foreclosure on assets or enforcement of outstanding debts.
The automatic stay in particular, along with other rights granted in the
Code generally, provide means by which the debtor can seek safe haven
32. See The Evolution of U.S. Bankruptcy Law, FED. JUD. CENTER, available at
http://www.rib.uscourts.gov/newhome/docs/the velution-of bankruptcyjaw.pdf (last
visited Oct. 23, 2014) (analyzing the three codes passed between 1800 and 1878).
33. See Whitaker, supra note 2 ("The [same] need for and policies behind a federal
bankruptcy procedure remain true today.").
34. Id.
35. See Tung, supra note 7 ("Bankruptcy law has two general aims: to provide
relief to the debtor .. . and to treat all creditors equitably in distributi[on].").
36. See id.; see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2012) (providing, under Chapter 11,
an automatic stay preventing, among other actions, the commencement or continuation
ofjudicial proceedings).
37. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-303 (2012) (discussing voluntary, joint-case, and
involuntary case petitions, respectively).
38. See id. at § 362(a) (stating that filing a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay
applicable to, with limited exceptions, all entities).
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from the marketplace.39
The second principal goal of bankruptcy can be characterized as
providing a means of establishing equality among creditors.40 By
preventing foreclosure and immediate liquidation of assets, larger and more
sophisticated creditors are limited in their ability to recover to the detriment
of smaller, yet similarly situated creditors and those who file first are
limited from depleting resources before those who file later can assert a
claim.41
While many different bankruptcy codes have come and gone, the
42underlying need for a uniform bankruptcy code persists. When
financially distressed organizations approach the point of insolvency,
bankruptcy provides a safe haven for the debtor, while ensuring equality
among similarly situated creditors.
B. Chapter 11 and the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Realigning the Code with
the Goals
The formation of a new bankruptcy code in 1978 was in response to
dramatic changes in the underlying credit market not envisioned by even
the most recent amendments to the 1898 Code, the 1938 Chandler Act.4 3
Among the changes was the newly formed Chapter 11, geared to address
reorganization cases more complex than those contemplated by the
Chandler Act.44 At the time, a debtor maintained a capital structure often
39. See, e.g., id. at § 1121(b) ("Except as otherwise provided in this section, only
the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief under
this chapter."). But see Supra text accompanying note 7 (discussing the power under
section 112 to convert a case to Chapter 7).
40. See Tung, supra note 7; Supra text accompanying note 35; Patricia Rummer,
Chapter II: Haven for Megacases?, COM. L. BULL., July-Aug. 1988, at 12, 13 ("The
equality of distribution concept inherent in bankruptcy proceedings means that all
claimants get a chance to share in whatever funds are set aside for claims. It gives all
the claimants a level playing field."); see also § 362 (providing an automatic stay that
prevents creditors from receiving any distributions before the entire class of claimants
is established).
41. See Rummer, supra note 40, at 14 (discussing In re A.H. Robins Co., 846 F.2d
267 (4th Cir. 1988)) (discussing the inequality based on timing issue by way of
reference to a debtor who feared that if it "had been required to pay a substantial
number of claims in a brief period of time, its resources would have been exhausted,
and claimants at the end of the line would have been left with nothing").
42. See Whitaker, supra note 2; Supra text accompanying note 33,
43. See Robert J. Keach & Albert Togut, Commission to Explore Overhauling
Chapter 11, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36 (2011) ("[I]n [1978], we said we need to revise
the bankruptcy laws because the entire underlying credit economy in the business
world had changed dramatically in the 40 years since the 1938 Chandler Act.").
44. See id. (implying that changes in the underlying credit market necessarily
resulted in cases that are more complex).
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consisting of a senior bank holding a single note with a security interest in
all of the debtor's assets, and a group of dispersed, but homogenous,
unsecured creditors who could adequately be represented by a committee,
typically made up of a small group of the largest unsecured claim holders.45
With this structure, the debtor, the bank, and the committee could all sit at
the bargaining table and work out a reorganization plan.46 Albert Togut has
characterized the classic reorganization under the 1978 Code as:
one in which a distressed company [could] find protection in the safe
harbor of Chapter 11, dispose of unprofitable parts of the business [via
liquidation or sale], stabilize what remain[ed], operate for a short time to
see that the core business [could] be profitable, propose a plan based
upon the smaller, profitable core business, restructure its balance sheet
pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan, and emerge as a healthy, albeit smaller,
business enterprise.47
This characterization demonstrates how the 1978 Code supported the
goals of bankruptcy by providing equality for creditors and a safe haven for
debtors. While still greatly exposed to the systemic uncertainty of
bankruptcy, creditors were generally afforded adequate protection.48 The
Code provides that the creditors, as a uniform class, have a place at the
bargaining table and can influence the reorganization plan.49 In addition, as
this class is represented by a committee, even those creditors who held
valid claims but did not actively participate in the bankruptcy process
reaped rewards as members of the homogeneous class of unsecured
creditors.50 In short, this example illustrates the 1978 Code as providing a
system in which the debtor can seek the protection of bankruptcy and the
45. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11; 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) ("[A]s soon as
practicable after the order for relief under chapter 11 of this title, the United States
trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims .... )
1102(b)(1) ("A committee of creditors appointed under subsection (a) of this section
shall ordinarily consist of the persons, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest
claims against the debtor of the kinds represented on such committee . . . .").
46. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note II (noting that under the contemplated
system, the parties "bargained with each other against a backdrop of well-developed
norms").
47. Keach & Togut, supra note 43.
48. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 656 (articulating that the
creditors were not only represented by a committee, but that the committee had the
ability to hire accountants, investment bankers, lawyers, and others, at the expense of
the debtor, to help protect the class).
49. See id. at 656-57 ("[A] debtor would be hard-pressed to confirm a plan of
reorganization over the active opposition of the creditors . . . .").
50. See Baird & Rasmussen supra note 11; Supra text accompanying note 45.
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creditors can be assured equal class treatment.51
C. Chapter 11 Today
Just as four decades of progress led to the demise of the Chandler Act of
1938, the 1978 Code is confronting seemingly insurmountable challenges.
Two of the most pronounced, in the context of Chapter 11, are (i) the
Code's inability to keep up with drastic evolution of credit markets, and (ii)
the Code confronting the creation of a market in claims trading.
1. Failing to keep up with Evolving Credit Markets
Similar to the pressures weighing on the Chandler Act before its
replacement, the 1978 Code is beginning to reach levels of critical stress.5 2
Rich Levin, an attorney involved in shaping the 1978 Code, characterized
the change at an American Bankruptcy Institute event and discussed how
the same underlying need for revision has emerged today:
[A]t the time in [1978], we said we need to revise the bankruptcy laws
because the entire underlying credit economy in the business world had
changed dramatically in the 40 years since the 1938 Chandler Act. At the
same time, we said we knew that there would need to be a bankruptcy
reform act of 2018, 40 years hence, because the ntire credit economy and
business world would change again. Now, it's changed dramatically in 30
years, and I think we're at that point .. . that the system needs to be
rethought. It's done very well keeping up with the dramatic changes in the
underlying business and credit economy, but it's stretched dramatically. .
it's not designed for the current economy, and it needs to be rethought.3
While legal scholars and practitioners continue to debate overhauling the
1978 Code, for now consider the principles envisioned in the 1978 Code,
and how today's underlying credit market and business world are
undercutting the value added by the Code.5 4
When a corporation seeks Chapter 11 protection, no longer is there a
single senior bank holding a single note with a security interest in all of the
debtor's assets.55 No longer is there a group of dispersed, but homogenous,
51. See Tung, supra note 7.
52. See Keach & Togut, supra note 43 (analogizing pressures on the Code before
the 1978 overhaul and pressures on the Code today).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Katy Stech, Report on Corporate Bankruptcy Reform Expected in
December 2014, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 16, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/
2013/12/16/report-on-corporate-bankruptcy-reform-expected-in-december-
2014/tab/print/) (detailing some of the contentions, for example, those who want to
limit lender control, opposed to Keach & Togut, supra note 43).
55. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11 (comparing the 1978 credit market to
today's credit market).
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unsecured creditors.5 6 Instead, the traditional bank loan has evolved into a
complex lending product often characterized by a web of syndicated loan
parcels. The traditional bank lender has transformed into a primary loan
servicer charged with managing the loan on behalf of interested parties.58
The unsecured creditors are no longer a class of homogeneous investors but
rather a mix of massive, sophisticated hedge funds and institutional
investors and a minority of small, passive creditors.59 The evolution of the
traditional bargaining parties makes the negotiation process vastly more
complex.60
Chapter 11, however, has strained without breaking under this increased
pressure.61 If creditors' rights under Chapter 11 can be reduced to the idea
that Chapter 11 not only promotes the interests of creditors as a group, but
also ensures that similarly situated creditors are treated equally, the
increased complexity has damaged the ability of Chapter 11 to serve these
goals.62 The creditors' interests as a class are still protected by the
automatic stay, and the provisions that allow for efficient distribution of
assets still encourage greater capitalization  remaining assets, but where
Chapter 11 begins to fall short is in terms of the parties in interest. The
secured lenders, greatly expanded in number, maintain the ability to work
with the debtor to seek the best return on their claims, but equality among
them is questionable as each may have a different agenda.6 3 While Chapter
11 still recognizes that the value of a business as a going-concern may
greatly exceed its liquidated value, the goal of Chapter 11 to ensure equal
treatment among similarly situated creditors is becoming greatly
underserved.
2. The Added Pressures of Claims Trading
Concurrent with the growth in the complexity of the parties involved in a
Chapter 11 proceeding, is an evolution in the relationship among them.6





60. See Levitin, supra note 17; Supra text accompanying note 18.
61. See Keach & Togut, supra note 43; Levitin, supra note 17, at 67, 110 n.241
(noting that the system has held up "surprisingly well").
62. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 657 (describing the fitment of the
new parties into the old system as awkward).
63. See id. (explaining that "[r]ather than dispersed and homogenous, [creditors'
agendas] are close at hand, well informed, and radically different from one another").
64. See id. (lamenting the relationship as one that is disparate but served as if
homogenous).
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economic right, regardless of its eventual valuation.6 5  During the
bankruptcy case, "[a]s with most economic rights, claims enjoy a strong
presumption of free alienability."66 This presumption alters the relationship
among the creditors as envisioned by the Code.67 Rather than a dispersed,
but homogenous class, claims trading allows unsecured creditors to be
further reduced into any number of subclasses.6 8  Some are passive
creditors who typically hold their claims by virtue of a holding trade debt69
preceding the filing and can be grouped as passive by a shared inability to
participate in the bankruptcy proceedings. Others are massive claims
holders hoping to assume control of the debtor by virtue of their large
stake.70 Still others seek value absent any desire to manage the
corporation.7' Far from homogeneous, the vast number of players in the
bankruptcy process, combined with the free alienability of claims, has
transformed bankruptcy into a market of its own.72 It is with this evolution
that the particular problem addressed by this Comment arises: claims
trading and the dilemma of the passive creditor.
II. EXPLOITING THE PASSIVE CREDITOR
While the debate as to the merit of claims trading will press on for some
time, even those who can see the value-adding nature of claims trading can
readily identify improvable areas. Drain and Schwartz describe one such
area as the imbalance between passive and sophisticated creditors, noting
that:
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2012) (defining the term claim as a right to payment,
regardless of its later determined value).
66. Tung, supra note 7, at 1687.
67. See Levitin, supra note 17.
68. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
69. Michelle Hamer, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications
ofActivist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM. L. REv. 703, 713 (2008) (typifying
trade debt as a "claim against a [debtor] held by the [its] suppliers and vendors")
70. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control, 15 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1022 (2007) (noting the
recent emergence of hedge funds taking an active part in acquiring and managing
corporations).
71. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 661 n.57 (describing
investment firm ESL's purchase of Kmart out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy for nearly $1
billion; selling Kmart's undervalued real estate assets for $900 million; and ultimately
profit[ing] over $3 billion from selling off Kmart properties all without long-term
management aspirations).
72. See Levitin, supra note 17 (discussing the transformation of bankruptcy into a
market-driven process; one that is "a robust market for all types of claims against
debtors...").
73. See id. at 110 (asserting that improvements can be made, regardless of greater
debates as to the merits of claims trading).
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there is at least good anecdotal evidence that small unsophisticated
sellers - trade creditors sometimes characterized as 'involuntary'
participants because they did not buy their claims as investments but,
rather, were stuck with their obligor's default - already are widely
engaged in the distressed debt market and are taken advantage of 74
But is this a problem? Many heavily regulated markets allow for willing
buyers and willing sellers to form disadvantageous agreements. For
example, the securities market, one of the most heavily regulated
marketplaces, confronts issues of fraud while still allowing instances of
great unfairness.76 The issue, however, is that the logic that compares a
market in claims to a market in securities, overlooks bankruptcy's anti-
market approach.77 That is, the design of the Code is to protect the debtor
from the market place.78 While participants in the securities market may be
protected only from fraud, the protection brought by bankruptcy extends
much further.79
To illustrate the problem facing passive creditors, this Section will first
(a) look at claims trading as it relates to the code and to the passive
investor. This Section will then (b) analyze how the process weighs on the
ability of bankruptcy to meet the goals of providing equality to the
creditors. Finally, this Section (c) will analyze provisions of the Code that
seem operable in the context of claims trading, but are yet to be invoked.
A. The Bankruptcy Code and the Claims Trading Grift: Misuse, Abuse, or
Something Else?
Perhaps what is most challenging about redressing the harm imposed on
passive creditors is the Code's approval of the practice. Rather than misuse
or abuse of the Code, claims trading is something else entirely. Consider
first (i) how the Code permits the practice, and then (ii) how the trade is
carried out.
74. Drain & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 572-73.
75. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (holding that
under the U.S. Securities laws, "not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes
fraudulent activity [actionable] under § 10(b)").
76. See id.
77. See Levitin, supra note 17, at 71 (finding that bankruptcy "protect[s] a firm
from the forces of the market").
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Drain & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 573 ("Bankruptcy has its own
disclosure, voting and remedial regime that, although not a perfect overlap with the
securities laws, largely negates the need to apply them.").
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1. Permitting the Grift
Perhaps for good reason, claims trading is referred to by some as vulture
investing.80 Like vultures, the investors circle above, waiting for the deeply
insolvent corporation to fail before feasting on the remains.' While the
imagery may be useful for some, the modem level of sophistication in the
marketplace enables the market for claims trading to form well before an
organization files its petition for Chapter 11 protection. 82 Sophisticated
debt investors are best able to capitalize on the bankruptcy by purchasing
claims when others, fearful of the unknown, are willing to sell at steep
discounts.83 This fear is perhaps most pronounced right before the entity
files for bankruptcy protection, as creditors weary of their payment priority
might want out before any filing. 84 Those who do not get out before filing
must endure the process as set forth in the Code. So how does the Code
regulate their activity?
The bankruptcy case begins with the filing of a Chapter 11 petition.85
The filing operates as a stay upon all collection actions, applicable to all
entities.86 This stay covers, among other things, any attempt to "collect,
assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case."87  This provision both protects the debtor
from a wave of collection actions, up to and including foreclosures and
repossessions, and protects the creditors from one another by limiting the
80. See, e.g., Brockway, supra note 26, at 655 ("Many view bankruptcy as the
death of an investment, but to a keen-eyed vulture investor it is the birth of
opportunity.").
81. See Drain & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 571 ("[V]ulture investing, which
often occurs with an eye to obtaining a controlling interest in the reorganized debtor's
equity securities by means of acquiring bankruptcy claims . . ."); Henry T. C. Hu &
Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and
Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 625, 732 (2008) (describing a vulture investor as one
who, "when a firm gets into financial distress. . . accumulate[s] large stakes in a debt
class that [is] likely to be pivotal in the expected restructuring").
82. See Hu & Black, supra note 81 (articulating that investors begin forming
positions "when a firm gets into financial distress").
83. See, e.g., Brockway, supra note 26 (stating that: "[a] bankruptcy filing is also
among creditors' worst fears [as] [t]he value of their debt and the timing and amount of
repayment is uncertain. Some creditors, especially those unfamiliar with bankruptcy,
are willing to sell their claims against the bankrupt debtor for pennies on the dollar");
In re Chateaugay Corp., No. 86B11270, slip op. at 2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. I1, 1988)
(order denying assignment) (reviewing a request for assignment of over 400 claims
purchased at thirty three percent of their face value when purchaser planned to propose
a plan paying one hundred percent of the claims face value after acquisition).
84. See Brockway, supra note 26, at 655; Supra text accompanying note 83.
85. See supra text accompany note 38.
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) ("[A] petition filed ... operates as a stay . . .
87. Id. at § 362(a)(6).
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drain on the corporate assets.88 The protection for the creditors, however,
is limited to each creditor's interaction with the debtor, and does not cover
interactions among the creditors.8 9 While the Code once provided a means
by which the bankruptcy judge could manage these relationships, the
provisions have subsequently been gutted.90
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001 ("Rule 3001") recognizes a
creditor's right to freely alienate his claim without judicial approval or
oversight.9' As initially passed, former Rule 3001 required that the
transferee file disclosure documents with the court regarding the terms of
transfer and the consideration therefore.92 By requiring such disclosures,
the bankruptcy judge could weigh in on the individual transactions.9 3 This
process was considered by some to be frustrating the goal of market
liquidity because many courts refused to authorize the transfer of claims
until "adequate information" was provided.94 However, for a seller to be
truly adequately informed, the seller would likely have to be informed of
the details that make the deal worthwhile for the buyer.95 For buyers,
whose edge in the transaction is detailed knowledge of the debtor,
enhanced disclosure requires them to show their hand, resulting in sellers
unwilling to part with their claims at profitable discounts.9 6
Today, Rule 3001 requires only that the transferee provide evidence of
the transfer to the court and that if the transferor does not object within
twenty days the transfer is deemed settled.97 Thus, the court's oversight
role has been reduced from an ability to govern transfers to simply
88. See, e.g., Rummer supra note 40, at 14; Supra text accompanying note 41.
89. See § 362(a)(6) (limiting the ability for creditors to pursue the bankrupt firm,
but not proscribing creditors from interacting with one another).
90. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) advisory committee's note ("Subdivision (e) is
amended to limit the court's role to the adjudication of disputes.").
91. See id. (allowing for the free alienation of claims).
92. See Andrew P. Logan Ill, Note, Claims Trading: The Need for Further
Amending Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(e)(2), 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 495, 500 (1994) ("Former Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) [] required disclosure of the
'terms of the transfer' and 'the consideration therefor."').
93. See id. (finding that courts had the power to "refuse [I to authorize the transfer
of claims").
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 241 at 242-44 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1988) (seeking to remedy insufficient disclosure by imposing on the debtor "the duty of
advising the potential assignor of the debtor's estimate of the value of the claim ...
until such time as a new plan of reorganization and disclosure statement are filed").
96. See Logan, supra note 92 (indicating that enhanced disclosure requirements
imposed by the court were "frustrating the goal of providing a liquid market for the sale
of claims").
97. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e)(4).
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resolving disputed transfers.98 Critical to the amended rule is the absence
of a requirement for the disclosure of terms or consideration.99 By
withholding this information from the record, creditors who are willing to
sell their claims have no indication of how similar claims have been valued
and are deprived of the benefit of class participation.
In its accompanying note to the 1991 Amendment, the advisory
committee noted that the purpose of the Rule 3001 Amendment is:
[T]o limit the court's role to the adjudication of disputes regarding
transfers of claims. . . . This rule is not intended either to encourage or
discourage post-petition transfers of claims or to affect remedies
otherwise available under nonbankruptcy law to a transferor or transferee
such as for misrepresentation in connection with the transfer of a
claim. 0
With this limitation placed in the Code, willing market participants are
unprotected by the judiciary, unless there has been a fraudulent transfer.01
With this reduction in oversight, the rapid growth in claims trading is far
from unexpected.
2. The Grifi
If the bankruptcy Code and Rules allow for claims trading, and in fact
have been altered to restrict judicial oversight of claims trading, how can
the exploitation germane to the changes be objectionable? Consider the
actual trade that occurs between a passive investor and a sophisticated debt
investor.
As noted above, bankruptcy proceedings begin upon filing of a Chapter
11 petition.102 Then, the debtor must file with the court a list of creditors
and a schedule of its assets and liabilities.10 3  This list will serve as a
98. See Logan, supra note 92 ("[T]he [amended] Rule eliminates any requirement
that the filings with the court reflect either the "terms of the transfer" or "the
consideration therefor.").
99. See generally FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (failing to impose disclosure
requirements).
100. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (quoting the advisory committee's note to the 1991
Amendment to Subsection (e)).
101. See Logan, supra note 92, at 501 ("Thus, Rule 3001(e)(2) restricts the court's
function with respect to transferred claims to resolving whether a disputed transfer has
in fact been made by the transferor, by providing only the transferor with standing to
object to the transfer of a claim.").
102. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2012) (referring to a section entitled "Debtor's
Duties," this section provides that "(a) [t]he debtor shall (1) file (A) a list of creditors;
and (B) unless the court orders otherwise (i) a schedule of assets and liabilities . . .").
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preliminary snapshot of what the debtor has in way of assets, what claims
the debtor has recognized, and what claims are disputed, contingent, or
unliquidated.04 Once this snapshot is filed with the court, those creditors
who have been left out by the debtor will be given the opportunity to have
their claims established by the court.05  In the case where a claim is
challenged, by either the debtor or creditor, the court, after notice and
hearing, will determine the value of the claims as of the date of filing.1 0 6
For passive creditors, this stage of the process can be inconsequential as
their typical type of claim, if not already disclosed by the debtor, is easily
established.07 Nevertheless, what does affect the passive creditors is the
result of this process. Once these steps have taken place, the court will
have produced a list detailing the outstanding creditors and the claims they
hold.'0o With this information, debt investors can begin to examine the
claims currently held and begin to formulate investment strategies.10 9 For
the passive creditors, this is where things get troublesome.
As the bankruptcy case progresses, investors will begin to solicit claims
holders."o The timing and valuation of these bids may vary wildly based
on the investor's acute knowledge of the case."' When an investor locates
a willing seller, the deal proceeds just as any transfer of right would. There
are negotiations, purchase sale agreements, and, finally, a trade
execution.112 The final step in the trade is the purchaser filing a Notice of
104. FED. R. BANK. P. 3003(b)(1).
105. See § 501 (providing that a creditor may file a proof of claim, in a timely
manner); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (providing the specific requirements for establishing
a proof of claim, noting that "[a] proof of claim executed and filed in accordance with
these rules shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the
claim").
106. See § 502(b) ("[I]f such objection to a claim is made, the court, after notice and
a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim.").
107. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (providing the technical requirements for
establishing a claim and allowing for an inference that trade debt should be easy to
established the validity of, so long as adequately accounted for by the creditor); Hamer,
supra note 69 and accompanying text.
108. See § 52 1(a) (requiring a list to be filed with the court).
109. See Joshua Nahas, Trade Claims Primer, DISTRESSED DEBT INVESTING (Oct.
26, 2010), http://www.distressed-debt-investing.com/2010/10/trade-claims-
primer_26.html ("For a sophisticated [] investor it is possible to begin negotiations to
purchase a claim utilizing information [on the list].").
I 10. See id.
111. See id. ("[F]actors may come into play... that require a re-pricing or
cancellation of the trade altogether.").
112. See id. (describing the entire process as determining validity of the claim;
reconciling the value of the claim; establishing representations, warranties and
indemnification provisions; and, executing the trade).
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Transfer and Evidence of Transfer with the bankruptcy court.'13
The transaction is little more than a purchase and sale of an economic
right that is freely alienable. As a freely negotiated, arm's length contract,
some say the transaction presents little concern."14 After all, the Federal
Rules were amended specifically so that the filing of this notice no longer
affords the court the opportunity to assess the merit of the trade. 1'5 Rather,
like most contract law, it only allows challenges in the case of fraudulent
dealings.116 While it may appear that this should settle the matter, recall
that, unlike most parties to a contract, one of the parties to the transaction
here is a protected class."7
B. Claims Trading, Inequality, and Information Asymmetry
One of the prevailing goals of bankruptcy is to provide equality for
similarly situated creditors."8 Reaching equality, however, is a challenge
considering the great asymmetry of knowledge between the inside-
investors and the passive creditor. Any trade may have an institutional
investor on one side of the table and a passive creditor on the other.119 The
passive creditor knows only what it is out, that is, how much the claim was
originally worth, with little ability to price the claim post-petition.20
Conversely, the investor is a professional with the ability to more readily
ascertain value, and monitor the value on an ongoing basis.121 The investor
113. See FED. BANKR. R. P. 3001(e)(2) ("[E]vidence of the transfer shall be filed by
the transferee.").
114. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 17, at 73 (listing among the benefits, "allow[ing]
a creditor to 'cash out' at a certain price" (citation omitted)).
115. See Logan, supra note 92, at 501 ("Thus, Rule 3001(e)(2) restricts the court's
function with respect to transferred claims to resolving whether a disputed transfer has
in fact been made by the transferor, by providing only the transferor with standing to
object to the transfer of a claim.").
116. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001 (quoting the advisory committee's note to the 1991
Amendment to Subsection (e)) ("This rule is not intended to . . . affect remedies
otherwise available under non-bankruptcy law to a transferor or transferee such as for
misrepresentation in connection with the transfer of a claim.").
117. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 656 (observing that the protection
by the committee includes the right of the committee to hiring accountants, investment
bankers, lawyers, and others as needed and at the expense of the debtor).
118. See Tung, supra note 7; Supra text accompanying note 35.
119. See, e.g., In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985) (finding that passive creditors sold their claims to a sophisticated investor for
twenty percent face value shortly before approval of a reorganization plan paying sixty
percent).
120. See supra text accompany note 119; see Levitin, supra note 17, at 73
(characterizing "payouts [as] speculative").
121. See Levitin, supra note 17, at 73 (describing the sophisticated investor as one
who can "take the time and effort to monitor the debtor. . .").
112 Vol. 4:1
CURBING THE EXPLOITATION OF PASSIVE CREDITORS
likely possesses the specialized knowledge to determine the probability of
receiving any distribution under the plan of reorganization as well as the
timeframe of payout.'2 2  The result is an uninformed creditor being
solicited exit opportunities at a price that discounts the value of the claim
pursuant to the probability of payment, as well as the time value of
money.123 On top of this discount, there is the added margin by the
investor looking to build in as much gain as possible.124 The result is a
sharply discounted price and virtually no policing mechanisms.12 5 What
claims trading at this level amounts to then, is a passive creditor negotiating
with an experienced investor, in a world free from disclosure requirements
or judicial intervention.
The severity of this exploitation can be garnered by a look at what the
former Rule 3001 would prevent, and what its absence today would likely
allow, in the case of In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.1 26 In this case,
Phoenix Capital Corporation ("Phoenix") negotiated the purchase of
twenty-eight unsecured claims against the debtor.12 7 The relevant terms of
the transfer called for the payment by Phoenix to the creditors of twenty
percent of the claims face value.'2 8 To passive creditors who have little
information about the state of their claim, the sharp discount may be
appealing as bankruptcy promises them nothing.129  Shortly thereafter,
however, The Wall Street Journal reported that the near-approved plan of
reorganization was going to pay sixty-five percent of face value.'30
Relying on disclosure concerns, the court refused to approve the
assignment, fearing the claims holders where not "advised of their rights
and options."'3 1 Today, however, the check provided by Rule 3001 has
122. See, e.g., In re Revere Copper & Brass, 58 B.R. at 2 (finding that the investor
was able to determine the likely time and amount of payout when soliciting claims
holders with offers of only a fraction thereof).
123. See id. at 2-3 ("One of the evils attendant upon a solicitation of assignment of
claims for a cash payment such as is being made by Phoenix is that solicited creditors
may be unaware of their rights and options and fall prey to the belief that bankruptcy
inevitably will result in their receiving the proverbial 10 cents on the dollar or worse.").
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 2-3.
127. See id. at I ("Our offer is to 20% of the face amount of any valid, uncontested,
and unpaid claim.").
128. See id. at 2 (finding that "the assignor-creditors may indeed prefer the certainty
of the 20% cash in hand" even after learning of the possibility of 65% at some eventual
time).
129. See id.
130. Id. app. ("Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.... announced a reorganization plan
that would settle various creditors' claims by paying from 65 cents" on the dollar.").
131. Id. at 3.
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been removed, and similarly situated creditors would likely be unprotected
by the court. The gutting of Rule 3001 has left the passive creditor
markedly unprotected by the judiciary.1 32
C. A Protected Class: The Role of Creditors' Committees
The challenges faced by the passive creditor during a modem Chapter 11
seem insurmountable. The changes to Rule 3001(e) have left them
unprotected by the courts, the evolution of the credit markets have pushed
them out of a homogeneous class, and the growth in claims trading have
left them exposed to predatory solicitation. 133
It is easy to rationalize the problem of the passive creditor as one of
dereliction-the idea that, as with any economic right, it is up to the
possessor to exercise his right to the fullest of his ability. From this point
of view, fraud continues to be actionable, but general issues of fairness
yield to free market notions of willing buyers and sellers dealing at arm's
length.13 4 The issue however is not that of an individual passive creditor,
but rather, of the class itself.
When the Code passed in 1978, bankruptcy proceedings were relatively
simple.13 5 Upon filing, the debtor was afforded the safe haven of Chapter
11 and creditors were represented as a homogeneous class. Under the
Code, appointment of the creditors' committee ensured similarly situated
unsecured creditors were represented as a class.136 As noted, however, this
area of the Code has been sufficiently damaged by the evolution of the
credit markets and the gutting of Rule 3001.137
As these markets continue to evolve, the class of unsecured creditors will
continue to fracture, undoing bankruptcy's goal of equal treatment among
132. See Logan, supra note 92, at 501 (describing the limited judicial role as one
that "simply requires the transferee to provide evidence of the transfer to the court").
133. See STEPHEN G. MOYER, DISTRESSED DEBT ANALYSIS: STRATEGIES FOR
SPECULATIVE INVESTORS 298 (2004) (typifying the transaction as one where "the buyer
is trying to present the picture that he or she is 'the only sucker on the planet dumb
enough to buy these things; if you miss this bid, the next buyer will pay less.' And the
buyer may, in fact, drop his or her bid for a day or two and then increase it to reinforce
the reality that he or she is the only buyer in the market"); see also supra text
accompanying note 123.
134. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(e) advisory committee's note to the 1991 Amendment
("This rule is not intended ... affect remedies otherwise available under nonbankruptcy
law to a transferor or transferee such as for misrepresentation in connection with the
transfer of a claim.").
135. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note II and accompanying text.
136. See supra text accompanying note 45.
137. See Logan, supra note 92, at 501 (describing the limited judicial role as one
that "simply requires the transferee to provide evidence of the transfer to the court").
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similarly situated creditors.'38  Seemingly, without adequate class
representation, the problem for each passive creditor becomes one of
collective action. Commenting on the problem, Baird and Rasmussen
write:
As a group, the unsecured creditors would have been better off by taking
concerted action, but no one creditor was willing to take the laboring oar.
The costs of participation fell on those who participated, but the benefits
were distributed to all creditors. While for creditors as a group the best
course of action was to participate in the reorganization discussions, for
each individual creditor the rational thing to do was stay passive.139
Nevertheless, does this collective action issue, combined with the lack of
affirmative class representation leave the passive creditors with no other
choice than to try to participate in the reorganization? Not necessarily.
Under the Code, as soon as practicable after the order for relief under
Chapter 11, the U.S. Trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding
unsecured claims.14 0 This committee is to be made up of the seven largest
claims holders'41 and is charged with providing access to information for
creditors who are not appointed to the committee.14 2  Additionally, the
committee is empowered to negotiate on behalf of the class and collect and
process the information necessary to make informed decisions.14 3
Under the Code, the duties placed on the creditors committee establish a
fiduciary relationship between the committee members and the non-
committee members for whom they purport to act.14 4 The fiduciary duty
established includes the duty to maximize the return of the class as a
whole.14 5 This is embodied by the committee's unique place of power at
138. See Levitin, supra note 17; Supra text accompanying note 18.
139. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 655.
140. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012).
141. Id. at§ 1102(b)(1).
142. Id. at § 1102(b)(3).
143. See id. at §§ 1103(c)(2)-(3) (allowing for informed decisions under (c)(2) by
providing that the committee may "investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and
financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the
desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter relevant to the
case or to the formulation of a plan" and allowing for negotiation under (c)(3) which
allows the committee to "participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those
represented by such committee of such committee's determinations as to any plan
formulated, and collect and file with the court acceptances or rejections of a plan")
144. See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 138 B.R. 717, 722 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing the existence of a fiduciary duty).
145. See Levitin, supra note 17, at 111 ("Arguably facilitating claims trading is part
of creditors' committees' duties."); see also In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, 138 B.R.
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the bargaining table.14 6 Braid and Rasmussen characterize this power as
the unique ability to "extract concession from the debtor . .. as [the debtor]
would be hard-pressed to confirm a plan of reorganization over the active
opposition of the creditors' committee." 4 7
As claims trading continues to grow, and as Chapter 11 continues to go
unrevised, the role of the creditors' committee will be of added importance
to the passive creditors. The concern, however, is how well creditors'
committees are actually serving their fiduciary roles. Unlike the players at
the table in 1978, no longer are the committee members a homogeneous
class.14 8 The positions held today are incredibly complex and well outside
of what the Code envisioned.14 9 Committee members own debt up and
down the tranches.50  All are motivated by self-interest; for some that
means holding the controlling stake post-bankruptcy, for others it may
mean creating a credit event sufficient to trigger their credit default
swaps.'5' For Baird and Rasmussen this means, "the idea of a committee
as the principal vehicle for mediating the interests of the general creditors
as a group may no longer work." 52
D. Grifted, Now What?
When the Code was passed in 1978, the simplicity of the credit market
yielded a rather simple solution for passive creditors: committee
representation. As the markets have evolved however, the sophistication of
passive creditors has not. With little readily ascertainable data about the
entire claims trading market, it would be unfounded to suggest sweeping
reform in light of this particular area of concern.'5 3 This is not to say,
at 722 (recognizing the existence of a fiduciary duty as "extending to the class as a
whole and not to its individual members").
146. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 656-57 (finding that the debtor has
reason to listen to a committee but not an individual).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 651; Supra text accompanying note 14.
149. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 651; Supra text accompanying note
14.
150. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 651; Supra text accompanying note
14.
151. See, e.g., Karl Denninger, GM: Bankrupt, UNLESS...., MARKET TICKER,
(Apr. 1, 2009), http://market-ticker.denninger.net/archives/92 1-GM-Bankrupt,-
UNLESSFalse.html (speculating that GM bondholders were refusing to negotiate with
GM outside of bankruptcy because their bonds are backed by AIG credit default swaps
that would pay in full if GM filed for bankruptcy).
152. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 657.
153. See Levitin, supra note 17, at 70 ("[C]laims trading is not well-suited for broad
policy reforms. Instead, at this point, we can merely identify several modest features of
the claims trading market that can be improved.").
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however, that nothing can or should be done. What is clear, is that the
welfare of the passive creditor has shifted from the creditors' committee,
who have a fiduciary duty to serve them, to the good conscious of
investors, who have limitless motivation to exploit them.1 54 But all is not
lost.
III. REAFFIRMING THE ROLE OF THE CREDITORS' COMMITTEE
The harm imposed on passive creditors stems from an inability to value
their economic rights.'55  The inability to value their claim has been
exacerbated by solicitations from third parties trying to purchase the rights
at sharply discounted prices.156 At its inception, the Code would starve off
this issue by affording equal class representation for claims holders and
judicial oversight of claims purchasers.'5 7 The problem being confronted
today is how to improve the case of the passive creditor absent the original
protections.
Even with the amendment to Rule 3001, the answer to the problems
continues to be valuation.'5 8 While disclosure to the court used to provide
such, it did so in an onerous way that frustrated liquidity.1 59 While others
have reached this very conclusion, there is little discussion of how to reach
a balance between the desire for disclosure and market liquidity.
In proposing such a solution, this Section will discuss (a) why disclosure
is key to protecting passive creditors. However, because mandatory
disclosure of full terms would be too onerous, this Section will also argue
that (b) proper utilization of the creditors' committees presents a solution
that balances the concerns. Then, this Section will (c) demonstrate how the
creditor's committee can fulfill its duty to the passive creditors. Finally, (d)
this Section will discuss the inherent limitations of any solution to this
problem and how they may be overcome.
A. The Solution: Improved Price Disclosure
The biggest advantage the claims investor holds over the passive creditor
is knowledge.160 Even where the superior knowledge is not obtained
154. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 657 (advancing that the committee may
no longer work, meaning that passive creditors are at the mercy of the investors).
155. See, e.g., In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 58 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985) (underscoring the fact harm stems from an inability to value a claim).
156. See supra text accompanying note 123.
157. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11; Supra text accompanying note 48;
Logan, supra note 92; Supra text accompanying note 155.
158. See supra text accompanying note 155.
159. See Logan, supra note 92; Supra text accompanying note 96.
160. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 17, at I 10-11 (finding that "the most immediate
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illicitly, where a trade is "colored with superior knowledge ... assignments
are similar to contracts of adhesion."' The solution where the courts have
found such knowledge disparities was the imposition on the debtor "the
duty of advising the potential assignor of the debtor's estimate of the value
of the claim." 62 While this plan provided sufficient means for passive
creditors to price claims, the plans were imposed before judicial oversight
was eliminated by the amendment o Rule 3001.
While the means to impose this solution have been undone, the need for
such a solution has not.' 63 In fact, with the growth in claims trading, the
need has grown. A claim as a freely alienated right presents little concern,
but what has become a concern is how freely these rights are being
alienated. As the court noted in, In re Allegheny, massive disparities in
knowledge have resulted in what are essentially contracts of adhesion,
where one party dictates the terms while the other sits in fear of the "ten-
cent-on-the-dollar" alternative.164 What would alleviate this cohesion is the
means for a passive creditor to price its claim.16 5 The issue then, is how to
achieve this without former Rule 3001.
B. Requiring the Creditors' Committee to Serve as a Committee for the
Creditors
With judicial oversight stripped away, passive creditors are protected by
the Code only by way of the creditors' committee. While the membership
of the creditors' committee has changed, its fiduciary role has not.166
Creditors' committees have the duty to maximize returns for the class.16 7
This duty can be fulfilled only one of two ways: plan improvement, or exit
opportunity improvement.'6 8 If a passive creditor instead holds their claim
until plan confirmation, no exploitation has occurred as the court has
improvement that can be made of claims trading is improved price disclosure").
161. In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988).
162. Id. (imposing the duty only until a reorganization plan is reached and agreed
upon).
163. See Levitin, supra note 17, at 110-11; Supra text accompanying note 160.
164. See supra text accompanying note 123.
165. See generally Whitaker, supra 2, at 339 (arguing that "mandatory disclosure"
would allow "those wishing to receive cash for their claims [to] do so" for reasons
including better valuation).
166. See Levitin, supra note 17, at 111 (describing the duty as one that is owed to
the class "as it exists at any given time").
167. See id. ("Arguably facilitating claims trading is part of creditors' committees'
duties.").
168. See id. ("[M]aximizing the return . .. could be accomplished either through
working for a better plan or by providing their constituents with improved immediate
exit opportunities.").
118 Vol. 4: 1
CURBING THE EXPLOITATION OF PASSIVE CREDITORS
necessary considered the stake of all claims holders in confirming the plan.
The duty as it relates to passive creditors, then, is enhancing the exit
opportunity. Rather than leaving this to the free will of the committee or to
a third party, enhancing or reaffirming this duty should be accomplished by
the U.S. Trustee.
The Code charges the U.S. Trustee with appointing the creditors'
committee,169 as well as the duty of monitoring the committee.17 When
making appointments, the U.S. Trustee must confront issues such as
"adequacy of representation" and safeguarding of the interests of the
creditor class as a whole.171 When monitoring the committee, the U.S.
Trustee must ensure, among other things, that "[e]ach committee upholds
the interests of the creditor group it represents, such as unsecured
creditors." 72  The importance of U.S. Trustee's role can hardly be
understated.173
As claims trading grows and bankruptcy continues to evolve, the
obligations and duties of the U.S. Trustee can be leveraged to ensure that
modem Chapter 11 protects passive creditors. When the U.S. Trustee
appoints members to the committee, he or she must ensure that, even in
cases dominated by investors vying for control, the passive creditors are
still provided for.1 74  This seems to be an impossible task as passive
creditors realize a cost benefit in not participating in the reorganization.
By their very nature, a passive creditor cannot sit on the committee and
protect similarly situated class members. The remedy then, is to condition
committee membership on requiring the facilitation of non-coercive exit
opportunities for passive creditors.
Affirmative duties levied on committee members are far from novel. In
In re Federated Department Stores, Inc., ("FDS") the bankruptcy court
considered the presumptively inappropriate committee membership of a
169. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
170. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(e) (2012) (stating that each U.S. Trustee shall
"supervise the administration of cases" by, when considered appropriate, "monitoring
creditors' committees").
171. See Greg M. Zipes & Lisa L. Lambert, Creditors' Committee Formation
Dynamics: Issues in the Real World, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229, 255-56 (2003).
172. See The U.S. Trustee's Role in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., (Feb. 21, 2013, 4:50 PM),
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public-affairs/factsheet/docs/fsch I lduties.htm (Last
visited Feb. 22, 2015) (listing the duties and obligations of the US trustee in Chapter 11
Bankruptcies).
173. See Zipes & Lambert, supra note 172, at 255 ("In practice, the United States
trustee must resolve a variety of tensions that are inherent in the appointment
process.").
174. See 11 U.S.C. § I 102(a)(1) (2012) (defining representation without regard to
class).
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claims trader.175 Considering that committee members owe fiduciary duties
to the class they represent, a member trading in claims would likely violate
its duty.' 6  In FDS, rather than barring committee membership, the
member was permitted to serve so long as it took steps to protect itself
from breaching its duty. The court stated that the Movant: "will not be
violating its fiduciary duties as a committee member. . . by trading in
securities of the Debtors ... during the pendency of these Cases, provided
that Fidelity employs an appropriate information blocking device."'77
Since the FDS decision, the U.S. Trustee has appointed creditors subject
to appropriate safeguards to ensure that they can fulfill their fiduciary
duties."'78
Because the U.S. Trustee can contractually condition participation on a
committee, the US Trustee should exercise this power by conditioning
committee membership on the facilitation of non-coercive exit
opportunities for passive creditors.
C Facilitation of the Non-coercive Exit Opportunity
The harm claims trading imposes on passive creditors can be addressed
by increased scrutiny of the U.S. Trustee. Rather than imposing such a
requirement without providing guidance, the uncertainty of which could
seize liquidity, it is important to establish what would constitute fulfillment
of those duties. Because too much intervention for the sake of the passive
creditors could seize market liquidity and prove detrimental to the process,
it is important that the level of intervention be balanced.
Such balance can be struck by requiring that the creditors' committees
play an active role in facilitating claims trading for the passive creditors.7 9
In practice, some committees have already taken steps in this direction.
For example, the Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee in the Dana
Corporation listed the contact information of claims purchasers on its
website to help creditors it represented obtain maximum value for their
claims.o80 While this process fails to level the playing field in ways similar
175. See In re Federated Department Stores, Inc., Bankr. No. 1-90-0130, 1991 WL
79143 at *I (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 1991).
176. See Zipes & Lambert, supra note 172, at 246 (discussing the appearance of
impropriety that arises if a committee member engages in trading claims).
177. In re Federated Department Stores, Inc., Bankr. No. 1-90-0130, 1991 WL
79143 at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 1991).
178. See Zipes & Lambert, supra note 172, at 246 (noting that the U.S. Trustee has
imposed similar duties since the FDS decision).
179. See Levitin, supra note 17, at 110-11; Supra text accompanying note 160.
180. See Levitin, supra note 17, at 111 (noting that Dana's Official Unsecured
Creditors' Committee listed the contact information of claims purchasers on its website
to help the creditors it represented obtain maximum value for their claims).
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to judicial intervention, it represents a step in the right direction.
What is key to the role of the creditors' committees is that passive
creditors be apprised of some ability to value their claim and to understand
the trading process. A more limited role by a committee might include
informing the passive creditors of the opportunity to trade and the general
risk inherent in trading, while also providing periodic valuation of the most
prevalent debt type. Protection that is more substantial is embodied by
actively posting prices of known trades, along with providing contact
information of parties interested in purchasing claims. 18 ' This more active
representation would allow a solicited claims holder to reach out to other
registered purchasers to shop for a better offer.
What is critical to any approach employed, is not guaranteeing the best
price, but narrowing the knowledge gap between buyer and seller,
sufficient to make an assignment less coercive and more freely negotiated.
D. Limitations on Reform: U.S. Trustee Program Budget Constraints
The systemic limitation on any proposal that calls for enhanced
governmental action is the necessarily enhanced costs. The U.S. Trustee
Program operates in a self-funding manor, with fees collected deposited
into the U.S. Trustee Program Fund (the "Fund") for which offsetting
collections are available to the U.S. Trustee as specified in Appropriations
Acts.182 While the Fund currently operates at a surplus,183 the fiscal year
2014 budget proposal notes general fund instability related to fluctuations
in bankruptcy filings.' 84 The current system contains two fees: a filing fee
paid at the inception of chapter 7, 11, 12 and 13 cases; and a quarterly fee
by chapter 11 debtors based on cash disbursement levels of the debtor.'85
While the fee system has been sufficient for some time, enhanced duties by
the U.S. Trustee appointed to a bankruptcy case may put pressure on this
system.
Although the Fund currently operates at a surplus, the U.S. Trustee
Program's current fee structure could not likely support any rule changes
that imposed more taxing duties on the Trustees. Funding constraints have
181. See id. (one means of enhancing the exit opportunity would be by simply
"informing claimholders of the possibilities of claim purchases and issues in the
market").
182. United States Trustee Program FY 2014 Budget Request, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE 10, available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/05/09/ustp-justification.pdf
183. Id. at 6 (noting that offsetting collections from bankruptcy fees exceeded the
program's appropriations in all but fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008).
184. Id. (discussing the fluctuation from fiscal year 2013, drawing down the Fund
by $7 million, to fiscal year 2014, contributing to the Fund a projected $35 million).
185. Id. at 10.
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already limited the role of the program.'86 Hiring freezes and vacancies
due to attrition have left the program understaffed.'8 7  Debtor audits and
other operations of the program have been reduced or eliminated.'88 If the
solution to the exploitation of passive creditor turns on heightened scrutiny
of committees by the U.S. Trustee, the solution necessarily turns on
alterations of the fee structure of the U.S. Trustee Program. While the
specifics of the needed changes to the fee structure are beyond the scope of
this Comment, it is critical that heightened duties imposed on the U.S.
Trustee be complimented by funding; be it alterations to the current fees or
imposition of new fees.
CONCLUSION
Claims trading is a feature of the bankruptcy world that is here to stay.189
Much debate centers on its merit; trying to classify the practice as
beneficial or detrimental.190 Regardless of that much larger debate, it is
undeniable that there are ways in which it can be improved.191 Some have
resolved that improvement of Chapter 11 demands replacing Chapter 11 as
it has become "hopelessly flawed."' 92  Others "resolve to a credo of
markets correcting themselves."'93 In the meantime, much can be done to
improve the harms endured under the current system without bearing on the
liquidity of the overall marketplace.
One such harm endured is the exploitation of the passive creditor by
sophisticated debt investors. The exploitation arises from the intersection
of a dated Code and a modern credit market where the knowledgeable
investment firms can exploit the unassuing passive investor. Adding to
this dilemma is the deteriorating role of the creditors' committee as a
means to protect the unsecured creditors as a class because of
186. Id. at 9 (enumerating some constraints based on funding such as "imposing a
hiring freeze, temporarily suspending debtor audit activities and later reinstating the




189. See Baird, supra note 31, at 23 ("Long passed is the time when we could
usefully debate whether claims trading in bankruptcy was a good or a bad thing. We
should accept that it has become a fundamental feature of bankruptcy.").
190. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
191. See Levitin, supra note 17, at 110 ("If claims trading is to be a feature of the
bankruptcy world (and this may very well be a good thing), there are ways in which it
can be improved.").
192. David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors' Ball: The "New" New Corporate Governance
in Chapter II, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 951 (2003) (citing "other commentators").
193. Levitin, supra note 17, at 110.
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unprecedented growth in claims trading.
This is not to say that nothing can be done. While it would be premature
to impose any sweeping regulation, the U.S. Trustee and creditors'
committees can still address the problems faced by the passive creditor. By
looking to the fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the claims held by
the unsecured creditors as a class, the committees can be required to
facilitate claims trading for the class. This duty could be met in a number
of ways, all of which revolve around the concept of an increased ability to
value a claim. While a committee may not be willing to assume such a role
voluntarily, enhanced oversight by the U.S. Trustee can contractually
obligate the committees to begin working in this direction.
Reliance on the creditors' committee is far from the ideal mechanism to
protect passive creditors, but for the time being, it represents an achievable
step in light of an unwillingness to make changes that are more sweeping.
